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Introduction
Competition authorities address the challenge of anticompetitive horizontal agreements by both controlling mergers and …ghting cartels. Under the realistic assumption of a limited budget for the public agency, one may ask how much should be spent on …ghting cartels as compared with controlling mergers. Taking into account the incentives thus provided to …rms, in this paper we develop a very simple framework to determine the optimal competition policy mix between merger control and cartel …ghting.
Firms have been known to adapt their behavior to past decisions of the competition agency.
The most famous example is probably that of the Sherman Act, which, in the words of Mueller (1996) , "ironically, by prohibiting cartels, encouraged …rms to combine [...] and thus helped precipitate the …rst great merger wave at the turn of the century" 1 . Its impact on the …rst merger wave was empirically con…rmed by Bittlingmayer (1985) . More recently, and based on the analysis of duration for a sample of international cartels prosecuted in the 1990s, Evenett et al. (2001) found that joint ventures and mergers are adopted by …rms in cartel-prone industries where cartel formation is restricted. The following real-life example supports this statement: in 2005 the three main players on the French local urban transport markets were …ned for partaking in an anti-competitive agreement to share the public transport market of urban bus services during calls for tender 2 . As a result, two of them, Transdev and Veolia, changed plans and …ve years later noti…ed a horizontal merger, which was granted conditional approval by the French Competition Authority at the end of 2010 3 .
In our model we …rst discuss the case of this apparent substitutability between mergers and cartels. Then we also consider their complementarity, i.e. the case where …rms merge before engaging in collusion. This possibility is explicitly taken into account by the competition agencies, which are bound to assess a merger's coordinated e¤ect during its overall competitive appraisal 4 . Nonetheless, merger control being prone to errors, …rms may sometimes still take the opportunity to collude after having merged. For instance, on November 9, 2010, the European Commission …ned 11 air cargo carriers e799 million for a price …xing cartel that spanned over 1 This American example was later 'con…rmed'in the UK by the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, which similarly triggered a merger wave by outlawing cartels -see Symeonidis (2002 We start by discussing the …rms'choice to coordinate, and consider …rst that they can either form a cartel or undertake a horizontal merger. The relative pro…tability of the two options will depend on the probability of a cartel being convicted, as well as on the net private gains from mergers. Cartel …ghting is imperfect in our model, as not all cartels are punished, and the probability of convicting a cartel will depend on the amount of resources allocated for this purpose. This amount will therefore capture the severity of this action. The enforcement of merger control is also imperfect, since the ex ante assessment of horizontal mergers inevitably gives rise to both types of errors, i.e. clearing welfare-reducing anti-competitive mergers and banning cost-e¢ cient pro-competitive ones. This is mainly due to the asymmetric information between the competition agency and the merging partners on the true level of the merger's potential cost savings. Accordingly, in our model the competition agency (CA henceforth) may be able to identify and prohibit anti-competitive mergers provided it pays the cost of doing so.
The more resources invested in the merger control the higher the probability of identifying anticompetitive mergers. The latter will thus capture the severity of merger control in our model.
At any rate, given the limited budget of the CA, devoting more resources to …ghting cartels will prevent it from applying a stricter merger control, and vice-versa.
Explicitly, the trade-o¤ we put forward in this framework is the following. The money spent on controlling mergers enables the CA to screen them and thus avoid some welfare losses from the ine¢ cient, anti-competitive mergers. We call this a selection e¤ect. But this e¤ect comes at the cost of less intense cartel …ghting. This is a welfare-reducing e¤ect, which we call the detection e¤ect. We derive our results from the net outcome of these two e¤ects in terms of relative returns for the two instruments of the competition policy, merger control and cartel 5 See the European Commission's press release IP/10/1487. 6 See the cases M. 157/1992, M.259/1992, M.278/1993, M.562/1995, M.616/1995, M.967/1997, M.1128/1998, M.1328/1999, M.1696/1999, M.2672/2002 the European Commission declared that the joint venture was set up in such a way that it would not lead to any co-ordination of the competitive conduct of the parent companies on the market for air freight transport -see the European Commission's press release IP/02/1560 from October 28, 2002. …ghting. First of all we show that the two instruments, the control of mergers and the …ght against cartels, are complementary, and thus the CA will always optimally spend money on both branches of competition policy. This result may no longer hold when one takes into account the merger's coordinated e¤ect, i.e. its impact on post-merger market collusion. This materializes as a higher likelihood for a cartel to be formed and sustained after a horizontal merger, and therefore makes the …rms'strategies of merger and cartel complements. To account for this, we allow the …rms to choose between forming a cartel from the beginning, or merging …rst and later on forming a more stable cartel. In this case, and for a signi…cant enough coordinated e¤ect of the merger, the best way for the CA to tackle post-merger collusion is to …ght cartels rather than ban mergers. This is to our knowledge the …rst research paper to examine the optimal competition law enforcement mix between merger control and cartel …ghting. In a related but di¤erent context, Aubert and Pouyet (2004) dealt with the relationship between cartel-…ghting and sectorial regulation 8 . As far as antitrust and merger control are concerned, the only theoretical contribution, albeit from a positive perspective, is that of Mehra (2008) , which deals with …rms' choice between merger and cartel depending on the severity of the anti-cartel action (the …ne in case the cartel is detected).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We …rst present the benchmark case of our analysis, then extend it to take into account the merger's coordinated e¤ect. Each time we …rst discuss the optimal strategies of the …rms and the CA, then establish the optimal policy mix between merger control and cartel …ghting. All formal proofs are grouped at the end of the paper in a technical appendix.
Model
Consider the following setting in which the CA has a budget of size r and chooses the amount of resources to be spent on …ghting cartels and controlling mergers. The market consists of three identical …rms: two of them may engage in a horizontal merger 9 , or the whole industry may 8 See also Bensaid et al. (1995) , who investigate the optimality of having a unique antitrust authority to deal with both cartel and mergers, or whether it is on the contrary best to separate the two on account of strategic information and incentive issues. 9 More precisely, we consider a framework where the opportunity to merge is exogenous and the two …rms that contemplate this move are the only ones that may do so, for instance due to some technological complementarity.
Thus we leave aside the outsider's incentives to either merge with them or preempt the merger, since we do not instead form a cartel 10 . The group of two …rms is considered as a single player and we assume risk-neutrality throughout. The cartel is not detected with probability p c (c); where c stands for the amount of resources spent by the CA on …ghting cartels, with p 0 c ( ) < 0; p 00 c ( ) = 0; p c (0) = 1 and p c (r) = 0. In other terms we assume that if the CA concentrates all its resources on cartel …ghting, it detects cartels with certainty, whereas if no resources are dedicated to …ghting cartels, there is no cartel detection at all. The cartel provides a joint collusive payo¤ of C for the two …rms which may alternatively engage in a horizontal merger. We do not explicitly formalize the cartel formation but the cartel stability is captured by the size of the pro…t C earned if the cartel is not detected: The higher this pro…t, the higher the cartel stability. If the cartel is detected, which occurs with probability 1 p c (c), the ensuing payo¤ for the same two …rms will be the competition joint pro…t , where < C . Note that we do not explicitly use cartel …nes, but their role is captured by the lower pro…t made by the …rms in case of successful detection.
The horizontal merger on the other hand is not only a legal means of achieving coordination, but also a source of cost savings or e¢ ciency gains, denoted by e. The joint pro…t earned for the two …rms engaging in the merger is then equal to M (e). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there are only two types of cost savings, either high (e = e); giving rise to an 'e¢ cient merger', or low (e = e < e); giving rise to an 'ine¢ cient merger'. Both types occur with equal probability, and the higher the e¢ ciency gains, the more pro…table the merger: M (e) > M (e).
We assume that the e¢ ciency gains parameter e is a priori not observed by the CA, but the latter may however invest m = r c in merger control in order to investigate the merger project and thus observe the true level of e¢ ciency gains with probability p m (m). By symmetry with the cartel …ghting we assume p 0 m (m) > 0; p 00 m (m) = 0; p m (0) = 0 and p m (r) = 1: If the true type of the merger is not observed, the merger is not investigated, and if so, the merger is permitted 11 .
Finally, the merging …rms incur a …xed cost k in order to merge. This assumption captures the fact that coordination through merger is likely to be costlier than through collusion, or at any rate that merging requires a sunk cost as compared with forming and maintaining a cartel 12 .
Firms are however heterogeneous w.r.t. the cost of merging, and we assume that this cost is propose to deal with this aspect of endogenous merger analysis. 1 0 We assume for the time being that the merged entity and the remaining …rm cannot form a cartel afterwards.
Such a post merger cartel will be studied in the last section. 1 1 We follow here Sørgard (2009 uniformly distributed on the interval 0; k : We also assume that k is high enough to avoid trivial cases where the …rms always merge ( M (e) C < k); and low enough to induce all …rms to have incentives to merge if the cartel is always detected ( M (e) > k):
In terms of competition policy, the CA maximizes the expected consumer surplus from both …ghting cartels and controlling mergers 13 . Let w C denote consumers'welfare following a successful cartel, and w the status-quo competition welfare without any coordinated behavior whatsoever, with w C < w. Concerning the merger policy, the post-merger consumer welfare is
; meaning that the more e¢ ciency gains the higher the consumer surplus. Moreover, the e¢ cient merger is welfare-improving (w M (e) > w), whereas the ine¢ cient merger is welfare-reducing (w M (e) < w) 14 . However we assume this ine¢ cient merger to be still preferable to the cartel (w C < w M (e)), due to the presence of e¢ ciency gains.
For ease of exposition and without any loss of generality, we focus on the possible trade-o¤ between cartel and horizontal merger for the ine¢ cient merger projects only, so we assume that the e¢ cient merger is always more pro…table than the cartel: k < M (e) C : The policy choice under budget constraint will consist in determining the optimal spending on merger control and cartel …ghting respectively, i.e. the one that maximizes expected consumer surplus 15 .
The timing of the game will be the following (see the game tree below, starting with the second stage):
At the …rst stage the CA chooses how much to spend on controlling mergers (m) and …ghting cartels (c) respectively.
At the second stage Nature determines the type of merger.
At the third stage, the …rms make their coordination choice between horizontal merger and collusive behavior. If the merger is chosen, they notify it to the CA.
At the …nal stage, noti…ed mergers are cleared or banned. If there is no merger, then the cartel is convicted with probability 1 p c (c) and the market is forced back to its status-quo competition situation. Otherwise, the industry ends up with the collusive market outcome.
Insert Figure 1 The relevant equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and in what follows we solve the game backwards.
Optimal competition policy mix
At the …nal stage of the game the CA assesses the consumer surplus impact of the merger given the available information on the e¢ ciency gains. At the third stage, when deciding how best to achieve pro…table coordination, by merging or by forming a cartel, the group of two …rms anticipates the outcome of the CA's merger control decision. This means that the choice between horizontal merger and cartel is determined by the probability of a cartel being detected on the one hand, and the expected merger control decision on the other. The following lemma explains the CA's merger control decision, as well as the choice between cartel and horizontal merger for the group of two …rms.
Lemma 1 (i) If the merger is expected to be cleared at the …nal stage, then the ine¢ cient merging …rms decide to merge i¤ the merger cost k is lower than b k(c); where b k(c) increases with the amount of resources allocated to cartel …ghting (c).
(ii) If the CA observes the merger type, the CA blocks the merger i¤ the budget available for cartel …ghting (c) is larger than a threshold b c.
To begin with, Lemma 1 states that only the …rms with a su¢ ciently low merging cost will merge. We deduce that the population size of the ine¢ cient merger type increases with the amount of resources invested in …ghting cartels. The intuition is straightforward: the more money spent on …ghting cartels and thus the higher the probability of cartel detection, the higher the incentives for …rms to prefer the merger instead. Thus, the critical merger cost threshold increases with the cartel-…ghting expenditure, and thus more …rms decide to merge.
Secondly, if the CA observes the true type of merger (with probability p m (m), where m = r c), it will block the ine¢ cient merger only if enough resources are left for …ghting cartels. This is easily explained: a merger will be blocked only if the resulting expected welfare is lower than if the …rms are not allowed to merge, which in our model means they will attempt a cartel.
Therefore, for a merger to be welfare-reducing in our model, the cartel …ghting needs to be su¢ ciently e¤ective, i.e. enough money needs to be spent on detecting and punishing cartels and not too much on merger control.
Going back to the …rst stage, the CA determines how much to invest in controlling mergers (m ) and …ghting cartels (c = r m ) respectively. Its programme is therefore written as follows:
The following proposition gives the result of this budgetary trade-o¤:
Proposition 1 The optimal competition policy always involves both cartel …ghting and controlling mergers. The optimal investment in merger control m is such that 0 < m < r:
Let us explain this result. First of all, note that it is never optimal to spend the whole budget on merger control (m < r) since then the CA will clear the ine¢ cient mergers even if the true merger type is observed (see Lemma 1). In that case, there would be a positive gain from reducing the merger control expenditure. However, spending more on cartel …ghting (c > b c) will soon cause the gain from merger control to become positive, since the CA will now prevent e-mergers and thus avoid welfare losses. Thus, for c > b c; the CA will face a trade-o¤ between enforcing tougher cartel …ghting at the cost of lowering the quality of merger control (lower m, i.e. m < r). In order to determine the outcome of this trade-o¤, let us assess the marginal impact of a stricter merger control (higher m) on the expected welfare 16 :
: 1 6 The welfare expression leaves out the expected welfare from the e¢ cient type merger since we assumed that its decision to merge does not depend on the CA's policy choice.
The CA's choice of allocating more resources to controlling mergers has two opposite e¤ects on the expected welfare: a selection e¤ect and a detection e¤ect. On the one hand, spending more on merger control enforcement increases the probability of the CA screening the mergers and hence blocking the anticompetitive/type e mergers. This is the so-called 'selection'e¤ect, which, following from Lemma 1, is welfare-increasing for c b c. This e¤ect captures the marginal return of merger control, and decreases with the amount spent on controlling mergers. Indeed, the more money allocated to cartel …ghting, the higher the incentive for ine¢ cient …rms to notify a merger, and thus the higher the bene…t from screening mergers. In other words, both branches of antitrust appear to be complementary, since the marginal return of merger control increases with the resources invested in cartel …ghting. On the other hand, spending money on merger control always undermines cartel …ghting: this is the so-called 'detection'e¤ect, whereby fewer cartels will be detected and punished whenever the CA reduces the budget allocated to …ghting them. This e¤ect is welfare-reducing and captures the marginal return of cartel …ghting. It also increases in absolute terms with the size of the budget available for merger control. Indeed, the less money spent on merger control, the smaller the population of potential cartels, since more …rms merge. This is the other facet of the above-mentioned complementarity between the two antitrust instruments: in particular, if no resources are dedicated to merger control, then all …rms are induced to merge and will actually merge. But then the detection e¤ect would be nil, which explains why one cannot have a solution where the whole budget is spent on cartel …ghting.
The optimal split in the CA's budget therefore strikes a balance between these two opposite marginal e¤ects, which occurs for m 2 (0; r) : In other words, the interior solution obtains due to the complementarity between the two instruments since the CA is always induced to split its resources between cartel …ghting and merger control. We study the robustness of this result w.r.t. the introduction of post-merger cartel formation in the next section.
4 Post-merger cartel and the impact of merger coordinated effect In this section we abandon the assumption that …rms choose merger over cartel or vice-versa.
As stated in the Introduction, real life examples suggest, on the contrary, that the strategies of horizontal merger and cartel may also be complementary, in particular whenever the horizontal merger is the preliminary stage to an ensuing cartel formation. To account for such situations, and to assess their potential impact on the results obtained in the previous section, below we modify our framework in the following way:
Whenever the two …rms merge they will later form a cartel with the remaining …rm. It is enough to replace 'merger'by 'merger with ensuing cartel'in the game tree displayed in the …rst section (Figure 1) , to obtain the game tree that applies for the extended model studied in the present section. The post-merger cartel will be detected and punished with the same probability as before, 1 p c (c): Following the post-merger cartel, the fraction of pro…t accruing to the two …rms is denoted M C (e), whereas the consumer welfare becomes w M C (e): The higher internal stability of post-merger cartels, i.e. the easier coordination when the market becomes more concentrated (see Motta 2004 and Kovacic et al. 2006 , 2009 ) is captured by the pro…tability of the post-merger pro…t M C (e) and by the corresponding consumer surplus w M C (e): The higher the cartel stability, i:e: the coordinated e¤ect of the merger, the higher the pro…t and the lower the surplus 17 .
The timing of our game is unchanged, and as before, we start our analysis by deriving the CA's merger control decision as well as the …rms'merger decision in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (i) If the merger is expected to be cleared at the …nal stage, there exists a cost threshold e k(c) such that the ine¢ cient merger is noti…ed i¤ k e k(c). e k(c) is increasing in c if the merger coordinated e¤ ect is small, but decreasing in it otherwise.
(ii) If the CA observes the merger type, the CA blocks the ine¢ cient mergers i¤ the budget allocated to cartel …ghting is larger than a threshold e c: Moreover, e c = 0 for a high enough coordinated e¤ ect.
Lemma 2 indicates that the merger's coordinated e¤ect may substantially modify both the CA's merger control decision and the …rms' choice between either forming a cartel from the beginning or …rst merging before engaging in a cartel.
To start with, the severity of the anti-cartel …ghting may now have a di¤erent e¤ect on the number of potential merger projects, depending on the size of the merger's coordinated e¤ect.
For a low coordinated e¤ect, an improvement in the detection of cartels induces more …rms to merge, as before. Nevertheless, the opposite obtains for a large enough coordinated e¤ect, because the post-merger collusion may simply be the very reason why …rms decide to merge in the …rst place. As a result, the tougher cartel …ghting will reduce the bene…t of merging, and thus will deter more mergers.
Secondly, a high enough coordinated e¤ect may make the merger control bene…cial even if no resources are available for cartel …ghting, precisely because …rms may now merge in order to form a more stable cartel afterwards. Therefore the merger control enables the CA to prevent the post-merger cartels, and as such yields a positive return even if no resources are invested in cartel …ghting itself.
The objective of the CA is now written as follows: where EW coord (m) denotes the expected consumer surplus in the presence of a coordinated e¤ect.
The next result shows how the optimal policy mix may change due to the possibility of a post-merger cartel:
Proposition 2 (i) For a small coordinated e¤ ect the CA optimally splits its budget between cartel …ghting and merger control, i.e. there exists an optimal investment in merger control m with 0 < m < r;
(ii) A large enough coordinated e¤ ect makes the CA optimally spend its whole budget on cartel …ghting only (m = 0).
In other words, the previous result of Proposition 1 on the optimal budget split between merger control and cartel …ghting remains valid only if the coordinated e¤ects is weak enough.
Otherwise, the CA should spend all its money on cartel …ghting only.
In order to explain the intuition for this result, let us once again consider the role of merger control enforcement on the expected welfare, as described by the marginal e¤ect of merger control given below:
:
As before, merger control leads to both a selection e¤ect and a detection e¤ect. The detection e¤ect still involves a lower cartel detection as soon as more money is spent on controlling mergers.
As such, it remains negative. On the other hand, merger control still enables merger screening and thus avoids some welfare-losses from the ine¢ cient, e type mergers. Following Lemma 2, as long as the coordinated e¤ect is small enough, this e¤ect remains positive. Thus, for a small coordinated e¤ect, the optimal competition policy mix strikes a balance between these two opposite marginal e¤ects, yielding an interior solution for the optimal merger control expenditure (m positive and below r):
However, the importance of the merger coordinated e¤ect modi…es the size and even the sign of these two marginal e¤ects. A large enough merger coordinated e¤ect increases the detection e¤ect, because it induces more harmful cartels. This clearly shifts m downward. In addition, and following Lemma 2, the selection e¤ect is being reduced by the merger coordinated e¤ect, and may even turn out to be negative if the latter is large enough. Indeed, with a large coordinated e¤ect, and because a tougher merger control means weaker cartel scrutiny, more …rms merge in the end despite the higher amount of resources allocated to controlling mergers. Therefore this large coordinated e¤ect makes the marginal return of merger control negative, and thus the optimal policy will consist in investing only in cartel …ghting. In other words, here one obtains a switch from the former complementarity to actual substitutability between the two antitrust branches in the event of a su¢ ciently large merger coordinated e¤ect. To see this, note that such a large coordinated e¤ect induces the CA to privilege above all the prevention of post-merger cartels. But then any policy mix between the two antitrust instruments is sub-optimal, precisely by not completely avoiding these worst welfare-reducing post-merger cartels. Instead, the CA may prevent them either by spending all its money on merger control so as to block all ine¢ cient mergers later turning into these highly harmful cartels, or by directly investing only in cartel …ghting. The expected welfare comparison between these two alternatives shows that the cartel …ghting dominates. This is due to the fact that mergers, albeit anticompetitive, still yield some cost savings, whereas cartels never do. In other words, the CA is better o¤ detecting cartels while clearing anticompetitive/low-e¢ ciency mergers, rather than banning these mergers at the cost of leaving post-merger cartels undetected.
Conclusion
This paper examines the optimal enforcement competition policy mix in terms of merger control and anti-cartel policies, given that the observation of real-life market behavior indicates that …rms typically react to the current enforcement focus of the competition agencies (either against mergers or cartels). When studying the interaction between the enforcement of merger control and that of cartel …ghting, we accounted for the resulting incentives for …rms, as well as for the budget constraint of the competition agency.
When mergers and cartels are substitutable from the point of view of …rms (i.e. they choose one over the other), we obtain that the CA will simultaneously enforce both branches of competition policy. This may change if one assumes that merger and cartel are complementary, as happens when …rms merge …rst and then engage in collusion. In this case, if the merger's coordinated e¤ect is large enough, i.e. the post-merger cartel is easy enough to sustain, then the CA will invest all available resources available in cartel …ghting alone, because we show that the two instruments are substitutes and cartel …ghting is more e¢ cient.
(ii) If the CA observes the true merger type, then type e is cleared while type e is blocked i¤ p c (c)w C + (1 p c (c))w > w M (e): Note that the LHS of this condition is continuous and increasing with c. In addition, for high enough c (i.e. m ! 0) the merger is blocked since p c (r) = 0, whereas for c = r the merger is cleared. Therefore there exists a threshold in terms b c such that the merger is blocked i¤ c > b c:
Proof of Proposition 1.
For c b c, the interior optimal choice of merger control spending (denoted m) is de…ned by: Otherwise, @ e k(c) @c < 0 (meaning for a large enough coordinated e¤ect such that M C (e) > M (e) + C ).
